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Science, technology, and innovation have been cited as one of the key factors behind
the economic success of the Republic of Korea. By making continuous and massive
investments in research and development and in innovation, Korea has succeeded in
building a unique innovation system that supports sustainable growth of the Kore-
an economy. The factors that have influenced the Korean innovation system the
most are (1) outward-looking development strategy, (2) large firm–oriented indus-
trial policy, and (3) human resources, among many others. These are the sources of
both the strength and the weakness of the system. This paper reviews the develop-
ments of science and technology in Korea, evaluates their impacts on industrial
development, and attempts to derive from the discussions some lessons that may be
applicable to latecomers. 
Over the course of four decades, the Republic of Korea has transformed itself from
a stagnant agrarian society into one of the world’s most dynamic industrial
economies. In the early 1960s, when Korea first launched its industrialization
efforts, it was a typical developing country with a poor base of resources and pro-
duction, a small domestic market, and a large population. Korea’s gross national
product (GNP) in 1962 was only $2.3 billion (in 1980 prices) or $87 per capita,
which came mainly from the primary sectors.1 The manufacturing sector’s share of
GNP remained at a mere 15 percent. International trade was also at a very infant
stage: in 1962 the volume of exports was only $55 million, and the volume of
imports was $390 million. But Korea is now the thirteenth largest economy and one
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of the major trading countries in the world. It has achieved world prominence in
areas such as semiconductors, liquid crystal displays, telecommunications equip-
ment, automobiles, shipbuilding, and so on. Indeed, it is one of the key players in
the global economy. 
Korea has achieved in four decades what it took more than a century for the Western
industrial countries to accomplish. A rich literature on Korean growth attributes Korea’s
success to an assortment of factors, but there is broad agreement that the Korean gov-
ernment’s “outward-looking development strategy,” well-educated and well-disciplined
workforce, and technological innovation have combined to bring about what is called
the “Korean miracle.” 
Of the three factors, this paper focuses on the role of technological innovation.
What stimulated and facilitated Korean industries to engage so actively in research
and development (R&D) and innovation? What has been the role of government
in the process? And, to what extent has technological innovation improved the
competitiveness of Korean industries and supported economic growth? The paper
discusses these issues, with a view to drawing some lessons from the Korean devel-
opment experience. The paper starts by reviewing what Korea has done to learn
and acquire technologies for industrialization and how Korea has promoted R&D
and innovation and built up technological capability. It then analyzes the contri-
bution of R&D and innovation to industrial competitiveness and economic growth
in Korea. Finally, it draws some lessons for latecomers. 
How Korea Learned and Acquired Technologies for Industrialization 
In the 1960s Korea was barren in the fields of science and technology. There were only
two public institutes for scientific research and technological development: the
National Defense R&D Institute, which was created right after the end of the Korean
War, and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which was founded in 1959;
there were fewer than 5,000 research scientists and engineers in the public and private
sectors combined.2 In 1963 R&D expenditures remained at $9.5 million. 
Fortunately, Korea had a well-educated workforce relative to other developing
countries. The Korean workforce had an average of 4.98 years of schooling in 1960,
and the elementary school enrollment rate reached 100 percent as early as 1970.
Korea’s educational attainment in the 1960s stood fairly close to the level expected
for a country twice as wealthy as Korea (Cohen and Soto 2001). For this, Korea
owes much to the Confucian tradition, which holds education and scholarship in
high esteem.3
In this setting, Korea launched the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in
1962. Lacking technological capability, Korea had to rely almost totally on foreign
sources of technology. Korea’s policy strategy was geared to promoting the inward
transfer of foreign technologies, while, at the same time, developing domestic capacity
to digest, assimilate, and improve upon the transferred technologies.
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Korean Strategy for Technology Learning
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often cited as a key to technological learning and
one of the most effective means for latecomers to learn new production skills and
acquire managerial expertise. However, the Korean government discouraged FDI
by restricting ownership and repatriation of profits and imposing requirements on
technology transfer and exports. Such a restrictive policy was inevitable because
the public viewed multinationals as perpetuating the country’s economic and tech-
nological dependence and as reinforcing the asymmetrical relationship between the
industrial and developing countries (Koo 1986; Vernon 1977; Stewart 1978).4 For
this reason, FDI played a less important role in Korea’s acquisition of capital and
technology than it did in other developing countries.
The purchase of technology through foreign licensing was also of modest importance
in Korea because of the government’s imposition of foreign exchange controls. Being a
typical agrarian economy relying on agriculture for almost three-quarters of national
production, Korea in the 1960s simply could not afford to buy technology from foreign
sources. It therefore curtailed foreign licensing, which often entails long-term financial
commitments.
As an alternative to foreign licensing, Korea financed industrial investments through
long-term foreign loans. The Korean government brought in large-scale foreign loans
and allocated them to investments in select industries, leading to massive importation of
foreign capital goods and turnkey plants (see table 1). Industries later reverse-engineered
the imported capital goods for the purpose of acquiring needed technologies. The gov-
ernment selected not only the target industries for investment but also the entrepreneurs
who would implement the new investment projects, and some of those entrepreneurs
later became the owners of “chaebols” (defined and discussed later in this paper). The
FDI policy had much to do with the unique industrial structure of Korea. 
How Private Industries Responded
The response of private companies to such restrictive policies varied across industries.
In the case of light industries, such as shoes, clothing, textiles, and some intermediate
goods for import substitution as well as export, the major sources of technological
learning were OEM (original equipment manufacturing) production arrangements.
TABLE 1. Channels for Technology Transfer in Korea, 1962–81
US$ millions
Time period FDI Foreign licensing Capital goods
1962–66 45.4 0.8 316.0
1967–71 218.6 16.3 2,541.0
1972–76 879.4 96.6 8,841.0
1977–81 720.6 451.4 27,978.0
Source: Data from the National Statistical Office.
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Korean firms benefited most from such arrangements because they offered opportu-
nities to work with foreign buyers who provided everything from product designs and
materials to quality control at the end of the process. This was especially so in the case
of garment and electronic industries (Hobday 1995).
In the 1970s Korea’s development target shifted to more capital- and technology-
intensive industries, and the government implemented massive investment projects
to build up machinery and chemical industries. For the development of chemical
industries, Korea relied largely on the importation of turnkey plants, which
offered technical training programs as part of the package. In the case of heavy
machinery, foreign licensing was an important channel for technology acquisition
(Chung and Branscomb 1996). 
To help industries to adopt new technologies, the government created govern-
ment R&D institutes in the fields of heavy machinery and chemicals, such as the
Korea Institute of Machinery and Metals, the Electronics and Telecommunications
Research Institute, the Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology, the Korea
Research Institute of Standards and Science, the Korea Institute for Energy
Research, and the Korea Ocean R&D Institute. These institutes worked with private
industries to build a technological foundation for industrial development.
As a result, FDI had a minimal impact on the Korean economy, accounting for
only 4 percent of Korea’s cumulative total long-term foreign capital over the period
of 1962–82 ($9 billion). According to a United Nations report, FDI in all developing
countries in the early and mid-1970s accounted for 10–20 percent of their total for-
eign capital inflow (Ahn 1991). Over the period of 1962–71, FDI inflow in Korea
remained at $264 million, while imported capital goods reached $2.9 billion. 
In short, Korean industries acquired technology more from informal than formal
channels. As informal channels involve less market mediation, they are less costly; they
also require recipients to have higher capacity, not just in identifying and selecting
technologies, but also in absorbing, assimilating, and improving upon the transferred
technologies.5 Korea was able to acquire technologies for industrialization through
informal channels as a result of its rich pool of well-educated, motivated people. 
Building a Base for R&D and Innovation
While promoting technological learning for industrialization, the government also
made efforts to build a base for science and technology (S&T) development during
this period. The Science and Technology Promotion Act and the Science Education
Act were passed in 1967 as a legal base for S&T development. The Korea Institute
of Science and Technology (KIST) was established in 1966, followed in 1967 by the
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the central government agency respon-
sible for S&T policy. In 1970 the government enacted the Korea Advanced Institute
of Sciences Act, which created the basis for the Korea Advanced Institute of Sciences
(KAIS; currently KAIST). KIST was the first organization dedicated strictly to R&D
in Korea, while KAIS brought the U.S. graduate education system to Korea. In the
1970s various government research and development institutes were also established
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to assist industries in absorbing and assimilating technologies. In the early stage of
development, these institutions made two important contributions: first, they helped
industries to acquire new technologies, and second, they helped to build indigenous
R&D capability by repatriating many established scientists and engineers from
abroad. In 1974 the government started construction of the Daeduk Science Town,
where many public and private R&D institutes, including the government research
and development institutes, are now clustered.
Costs and Benefits of the Korean Strategy
The industrialization of Korea in the early phase was a process of learning how to
absorb and improve on imported foreign technologies for industrial development.
Technological learning, as opposed to indigenous technology development, was at
the core of the development strategy. These efforts brought positive results. Around
the end of the 1970s, Korea began to export items such as ships, semiconductors,
and television sets. 
The Korean approach to acquiring technology had both positive and negative
effects. On the positive side, this policy enabled Korea to acquire technologies at
lower cost and precluded the constraints often imposed by multinationals on the
efforts of local firms to develop their own capability. The approach was effective in
maintaining independence from the dominance of multinationals. On the negative
side, Korea had to give up access to new technologies that might have been available
through direct equity links with foreign firms. By restricting FDI, Korea failed to
adopt global standards in domestic business operations.6 The most important lesson
here is that had it not been for the well-educated workforce, it would not have been
possible for Korea to succeed in acquiring and using technologies through informal
modes of technology transfer.
How Korea Has Been Able to Build Up Indigenous R&D Capability
As industrial development continued into the 1980s, the technological requirements
of Korean industries became more complex and sophisticated, making it increas-
ingly difficult for Korea to acquire technologies through informal channels. Even
though the government eased its restrictions on FDI and liberalized foreign licens-
ing, FDI and foreign licensing did not increase significantly. To sustain development,
many saw the need to build indigenous R&D capability. 
From Technology Learning to Technology Development: A Policy Shift
The government responded to the changes in the technology environment by
launching the National R&D Program in 1982 and taking various policy measures
to promote and facilitate private R&D activities, including tax incentives, financial
assistance, procurement, and other promotional actions.
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First, the government introduced policy incentives that provide private firms with
tax exemptions or tax breaks for investments in R&D and human resource develop-
ment. In 1981 the government revised the Local Tax Law and the National Tax
Reduction Law to exempt real estate dedicated to R&D purposes from local taxes and
reduce the corporate tax for expenditures on R&D, human resource development,
and related facilities. One year after that, the Tariff Law was changed to reduce tariffs
on imported materials and instruments for R&D.
Second, in 1981 the government created the Korea Technology Development Cor-
poration, a bank specializing in technology financing, in order to facilitate the devel-
opment and commercialization of technology. The government reinforced financial
supports for technology development by establishing a nonprofit guarantee institution
called the Korea Technology Finance Corporation in 1989, whose major function is to
help small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to obtain loans for development or com-
mercialization of technology. The government complemented these measures by estab-
lishing the Industrial Development Fund (1986), the Science and Technology Promo-
tion Fund (1991), the Information and Telecommunication Technology Fund (1993),
and other programs to facilitate commercialization of new technologies. The financial
system for technology development in Korea was completed with the opening of KOS-
DAQ, a technology stock market. 
Third, a procurement program was introduced in 1981 to promote demand for
new technology products developed by SMEs, followed by many other support
programs, such as technical and legal consultancy services, technology information
services, technology trade and transfer, and so on. 
Fourth, government R&D investments have increased significantly since the early
1980s, when Korea’s S&T policy underwent a fundamental shift from technology
learning to technology development. The Ministry of Science and Technology
launched the National R&D Program in 1982, which was followed by the Industrial
Base Technology Development Program of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and
Energy, the Information and Communication Technology Development Program of
the Ministry of Information and Communication, and others. These initiatives pro-
moted industrial R&D by providing private industries with opportunities to coop-
erate with the public sector and by inducing private R&D investments for commercial
purposes. 
According to a study conducted by the Science and Technology Policy Institute
(STEPI 2005), the Korean government was offering 259 programs in support of
industrial R&D and innovation. R&D subsidies accounted for 30 percent of all sup-
port programs, technology transfer accounted for 13 percent, and support for
human resources development accounted for 11 percent. The government expended
$3.4 billion for loan programs, and $3.3 billion for R&D subsidy programs. The
tax revenue forgone because of the tax incentive programs amounted to $1.5 billion
in 2005. In contrast, human resource development support programs received only
1 percent of the total budget spent that year (see table 2). 
Figure 1 describes the R&D support policy of the Korean government. As indi-
cated, Korea’s S&T policy focused on promoting learning from foreign sources as
well as building up infrastructure for R&D and human resource development before
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1980. After 1980, it shifted toward nurturing indigenous R&D capability and, at
the same time, promoting and facilitating private industrial R&D. 
This marked a turning point for the Korean innovation system not only because
of the changes in policy orientation but also because of the changes in the role of
government in science, technology, and innovation. Before the change, the govern-
ment set the development target, selected the strategic technologies, and financed the
implementation of development programs. So, in the early development process, the
government played the role not only of planner and rule setter but also of financier.
This was particularly true in the areas of R&D and innovation.7
TABLE 2. Industrial R&D and Innovation Support Programs in Korea, 2005 
Programs Budget
Number of % of all % of all program
Category programs programs US$ millions budgets
Tax incentives 17 6.6 1,480a 15.9
Loans 15 5.8 3,402b 36.6
Procurement 2 0.8 394 4.2
Human resources development 29 11.2 106 1.1
R&D subsidies 77 29.7 3,253 35.0
Technology trade 8 3.1 61 0.7
Technology transfer 33 12.7 225 2.4
Technology consultancy 27 10.4 44 0.5
Legal assistance 29 11.2 34 0.4
Technology information 22 8.5 294 3.2
Total 259 100.0 9,296 100.0
Source: Shin and others 2006a.
a. Tax revenues forgone.
b. Amount of loan available.
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Development of S&T Policy in Korea
Notes: MOST = Ministry of Science and Technology; HAN = Highly Advanced National R&D Program; 
KOSDAQ = a technology stock market.
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How Industries Responded to the Change
Private industries responded to the changes in policy by investing massive amounts
in R&D. Most of all, the number of industrial R&D centers registered at the Korea
Industrial Technology Association grew very rapidly: there were 129 industrial
R&D centers in 1984, 200 in 1986, 2,000 in 1995, and more than 17,000 in 2009.
Consequently, the relationship between technology imports and R&D changed. The
ratio of technology imports to business expenditures on R&D declined sharply,
from more than 90 percent in 1975 to 30 percent in the mid-1980s.8
As figure 2 shows, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the ratio of royalty payments
to business expenditures on R&D in Korea was almost 100 percent, which means
that Korean industries spent as much money on licensing foreign technologies as
on R&D. But the ratio declined to 30 percent in the mid-1980s and to less than
20 percent in the early 1990s. In contrast, the ratio of business expenditures on
R&D to sales rose rapidly, from a mere 0.5 percent in the 1970s and the early
1980s to more than 2 percent in the 1990s. By the early 1990s, Korean industries’
mode of technology acquisition shifted from borrowing and learning from foreign
sources to conducting indigenous R&D. 
R&D investment has since undergone a quantum leap. Korea’s R&D investment,
which stood at only W 368.8 billion ($526 million, 0.81 percent GDP) in 1981, rose
steadily to reach W 31.3 trillion ($33.7 billion, 3.47 percent of GDP) in 2007. Over
a period of 25 years, investment in R&D increased more than 60 times. Korea
invests a larger share of its income in R&D than other countries with the same or
higher income. Korea now is the sixth largest spender on R&D among Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.
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FIGURE 2.
Changing Relationship between R&D and Technology Borrowing in Korea, 1976–2002
Source: Extended from OECD (1996). 
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R&D Structure
The rapid growth of R&D in Korea has been led by the private sector. Today, private
industries account for about 75 percent of the nation’s gross R&D expenditures,
which means that private industries are the dominant players in Korea’s R&D. Of
the total industrial R&D expenditures in 2007, manufacturing industries took up
about 90 percent. Manufacturing R&D is largely led by electronic equipment
(including office equipment, electronic components, and communications equipment,
at 49 percent), automobiles (18 percent), and chemicals (11 percent). Electronic
equipment, automobiles, and chemical industries absorb almost 80 percent of man-
ufacturing R&D, suggesting a very high concentration of manufacturing R&D in a
few industries.
The average R&D intensity of Korean industries was 2 percent in 2007, and the
intensity of manufacturing industries was 3 percent. The industries that invested the
largest share of sales in R&D include medical and precision equipment (8 percent),
communications equipment (7 percent), and electronic components (6 percent). In
contrast, construction, pulp and paper, food and beverages, and textile industries
invested less than 1 percent of sales in R&D (see table 3). 
Industrial research is highly focused on development (72 percent) and applied
research (13 percent), with the remaining 13 percent devoted to basic research. Of
the total industrial R&D, 80 percent was for new product development, while only
20 percent was for the improvement or development of processes. 
Industrial R&D activities in Korea are highly concentrated in large enterprises.
The 20 largest companies account for 56 percent of the total manufacturing R&D,
the top 10 companies account for 50 percent, and the top five companies account
for 44 percent. In electronic components, the share of the top 20 companies is 
91 percent (see table 4). The extremely high concentration of industrial R&D
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Growth of R&D Investment in Korea, 1963–2007
Source: KOITA. 
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TABLE 3. Manufacturing R&D, 2007
R&D expenditures R&D intensity
Industry (won billions) (%)
Total 21,339 2.97
Food 331 0.76
Textiles 146 0.86
Pulp, paper 40 0.71
Chemicals 2,399 1.49
Nonmetal minerals 142 1.20
Basic metals 171 0.63
Fabricated metals 75 1.92
Machinery 1,617 3.56
Office equipment 343 4.29
Electronic components 7,624 6.33
Communications equipment 2,886 6.71
Medical and precision equipment 205 7.50
Automobiles 3,831 3.42
Others 56 1.39
Source: KOITA 2008.
TABLE 4. R&D Concentration in Manufacturing, by Sector and Size of Firm, 2007
percent
Sector Top 5 firms Top 10 firms Top 20 firms
Manufacturing 44.3 50.2 55.7
Chemicals 21.9 32.4 45.9
Electronic components 85.7 89.5 91.4
Communications equipment 64.9 69.4 73.1
Automobiles 67.6 76.4 88.3
Source: KOITA 2008.
reflects the industrial structure of Korea, which is oriented toward large firms. The
top five companies in R&D investments are Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics,
Hyundai Motors, Hynix, and GM Daewoo Auto and Technology, all of which are
“chaebol” companies. 
Another unique feature is that foreign funds and institutions have a limited role in
R&D and innovation in Korea. Probably due to the once restrictive FDI policy, foreign
funds seldom flow into Korea for industrial R&D. The proportion of foreign funds in
Korea’s industrial R&D expenditures remains at 0.3 percent, while in many of the
OECD countries, foreign funds account for more than 10 percent of domestic outlays
for industrial R&D (OECD 2008a, 2008b). Given Korea’s position as one of the
world’s major trading countries, it is surprising that the role of international funds and
institutions in research and technology remains so low. 
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The Impact of the 1997 Financial Crisis on R&D and Innovation
R&D in Korea had been growing rapidly and continuously until Korea was hit by
the financial crisis in 1997. R&D was severely damaged by the crisis. Industrial
R&D expenditures decreased 10 percent in nominal terms from W 884.4 billion in
1997 to W 797.2 billion in 1998; R&D personnel declined 15 percent from
102,000 in 1997 to 87,000 the following year. This was a serious blow to the Kor-
ean innovation system. If the crisis had continued several more years, the Korean
innovation system would have collapsed. Fortunately, Korea recovered from the
crisis relatively quickly: it took only two years for industrial R&D to recover and
surpass the level prior to the financial crisis (see figure 4). Two factors explain this
development: one is that the government made up for the decrease in industrial
R&D expenditures by increasing government R&D expenditures. The share of
government in gross R&D expenditures increased from less than 20 percent before
the crisis to 27 percent during the crisis. Government R&D funds flew into private
industrial sectors—in particular, small technology-based firms—and helped them
to maintain and expand their innovation activities. The other is the promotion of
information technology (IT) and IT-related ventures, which led to an IT boom in
the early 2000s. The government’s commitment to IT development is evident: the
share of information technology in government R&D expenditures rose from 
13 percent in 1997 to 34 percent in 2002. Such a pro-IT policy fueled innovation
in the IT sector, which then spurred innovation activities in other sectors. This pol-
icy not only helped the Korean innovation system to recover its former vitality but
also promoted Korea’s transition to an information society.
The financial crisis brought about two important changes in R&D and innovation
in Korea. As firms—in particular large enterprises—downsized their in-house R&D
activities, many of the research scientists and engineers who were let go established
small-scale, technology-based start-up firms. The number of industrial R&D centers
increased despite the reduction in R&D expenditures in the private sector.9 As a
result, the role of SMEs in R&D and innovation became more important than it had
been before the crisis. 
Second, before the financial crisis, inward FDI had been insignificant for many
years and played a minor role in the Korean economy (see figure 4). This was espe-
cially true in technology and innovation. In the early stage of development, com-
panies acquired technology largely through informal channels; in the later stage,
technology transfer in the private sector was in the form of licensing contracts
rather than FDI (OECD 1996).
However, the situation began to change as Korea shifted its policy in the face of
the crisis. FDI inflows into Korea increased sharply, as a result of depreciation of the
local currency and asset values, the government’s deregulation and liberalization of
FDI, and the investment opportunities created by corporate restructuring as well as
privatization of government-owned companies. FDI companies clearly have played
an important role in technology development, as their share in the Korean economy
has increased.
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Factors behind the Rapid Growth in R&D and Innovation
Since it started the drive to develop technology in the early 1980s, Korea has emerged as
a major investor in R&D. What made this possible, and, in particular, what motivated
private industries to engage so actively in R&D and innovation? Many factors have con-
tributed to the rapid increase in private sector R&D investment, but two are paramount:
demand factors and supply factors. 
On the demand side, the government’s economic development projects generated
huge demand for technologies. In addition, international market competition placed
tremendous pressure on Korean industries to be technologically competitive. On the
supply side, Korean industries were able to meet the increasing demand for R&D
and innovation because they were financially able to do so and because their invest-
ments were backed by well-trained human resources. The government contributed
to this development in several indirect ways, too.
Economic Development Plans Based on an Outward-Looking Development
Strategy
In the early stage of development, the government’s economic development projects
were the major force driving R&D and innovation in Korea. The Five-Year Economic
Development Plans implemented during the period of 1961–91 specified strategic tar-
gets for industrial development. To attain the targets, companies had to invest heavily
in technology acquisition, which included R&D. 
Another important factor is the outward-looking development strategy adopted
as a means to overcome the constraints on development, such as lack of capital and
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technology, limited market, and so on. The government’s outward-looking develop-
ment strategy drove domestic industries into the international market, putting them
under fierce pressure to compete with foreign companies. In order to survive, com-
panies had to invest heavily in R&D.
Many studies have shown that the more oriented a company is toward interna-
tional trade, the more it invests in R&D and innovation. A recent study at STEPI
has confirmed this relationship using the Korean Innovation Survey data (STEPI
2005).10 The empirical study shows that companies with higher export intensity
(export volume to total sales) tend to invest more in R&D and innovation (Shin and
others 2006b). The study also finds a negative relationship between innovation
activities and market concentration. In other words, companies operating in a more
competitive market invest more in R&D and innovation. International competition
motivates companies to invest in innovation. But a reverse relationship may also
hold, as more innovative companies are more likely to compete well internationally
and sell more in the international markets. In that sense, the two are mutually rein-
forcing, and so the effects of one on the other are determined simultaneously.
Role of Chaebols
On the supply side, the government’s industrial policy favoring large firms gave birth
to a unique business organization in Korea: the “chaebol,” a conglomerate of busi-
nesses that is similar to the prewar “zaibatsu” of Japan. Chaebols, usually controlled
by the founding families under a highly centralized structure of ownership, enjoy
great financial affluence owing to economies of both scale and scope. But do chaebol
companies support innovation? There are two views. One argues that in such a busi-
ness structure, the major shareholder may pursue his or her private interests at the
cost of those of other shareholders, is likely to seek short-term personal benefits
rather than long-term company benefits, and may not actively pursue innovation.
Another argues that business conglomerates like chaebol may be able to reduce trans-
action costs and share risks through internal transactions, while, at the same time,
pooling financial resources for major investment projects. Furthermore, under the
chaebol system, decision making is highly centralized, enabling the company to
respond quickly to opportunities. 
Only a few studies have directly investigated the differences in innovation be-
havior between companies belonging to chaebols and independent companies.
Recently, a group of researchers at STEPI analyzed this issue using data from the
Korea Information Service covering 51,270 observations for the period of 1987–
2003 (Shin and others 2006a). Of the total observations, 2,064 are for chaebol
companies. The study divided the period into two: before the financial crisis
(1987–97) and after the crisis (2000–03), because the government changed the reg-
ulations governing the chaebol system during the financial crisis (1997–99). The
new regulation bans cross-financing and cross-investment between and among
chaebol companies, making the pooling of financial resources and sharing of finan-
cial risks between and among chaebol companies impossible. In other words, chae-
bols in the original sense disappeared toward the end of the 1990s. 
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The statistical analysis for the pre-crisis period shows that chaebol companies were
more able and more likely to invest in R&D than independent companies. But the
analysis for the postcrisis period could not find any statistically significant differences
in innovation behavior between chaebol companies and independent companies. This
supports the argument that chaebol companies, in the original sense, are big interna-
tional operators, have deeper pockets, are able to engage in risky and expensive R&D
projects that are unthinkable for independent companies, and therefore, invest more
in R&D and innovation than independent companies. This finding and the high con-
centration of R&D expenditures in a limited number of large enterprises suggest that
chaebols contributed significantly to the growth of R&D and innovation in Korea (see
table 5). 
Human Resources
Another supply factor relates to human resources. Korean industries have been able
to increase R&D investments rapidly, thanks to the abundant pool of well-educated
human resources. In both developed and developing countries, R&D investment is
constrained more by a lack of human resources than by a lack of financing. Korea
prepared itself well for development by investing heavily in education and human
resource development.11 Reflecting the investment in education, the school enroll-
ment rate at the tertiary level in Korea increased from 16 percent in 1980 to 37.7 per-
cent in 1990 and to 52.5 percent in 2000. The number of full-time researchers also
grew rapidly from 39,000 in 1985 to 100,000 in 1995 and to 180,000 in 2005. The
number of full-time researchers per 1,000 economically active persons in Korea was
9.2 in 2007, which is lower than in Japan (10.7), but higher than in other advanced
countries, such as the United Kingdom (6.1 in 2006), France (7.7 in 2006), and Ger-
many (6.7 in 2006; see OECD 2008a).
Government-Support Programs
In order to promote private innovation, the Korean government offers various forms
of incentives for industrial R&D and innovation.12 Overall, Korea employs grants
TABLE 5. R&D Expenditures and Number of Researchers, by Size of Firm, 1997–2003 
Small and medium enterprises Large enterprises
R&D activity 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003
R&D expenditure
Amount (won billions) 1,090.2 2,106.4 3,425.4 7,755.1 8,148.2 11,084.2
Percentage of sales 2.82 3.14 3.57 2.07 1.81 2.05
Number of researchers
Total 17,703 36,494 52,332 56,990 57,839 71,698
At the doctoral level 474 1,543 2,291 3,613 3,878 5,562
Source: MOST various years.
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and tax credits as the major instruments to promote industrial R&D; these are com-
plemented by support programs such as procurement, technical consultancy, infor-
mation, technology transfer, and so on. According to a recent survey, 259 small and
large programs support private R&D and innovation (Shin and others 2006a).
How effective have these programs been in promoting industrial R&D? There
have been a few attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy programs (for
example, Lee and Jang 1998; Shin and others 2006b). Quantitative assessments are
especially needed, but full-scale quantitative analysis is not possible due to the lack
of data. In 2006 STEPI undertook a survey of private industries to assess the effec-
tiveness of the government incentive programs. The results of the survey and data
from the 2005 Korean Innovation Survey formed the basis of STEPI’s econometric
analysis. Both the survey results and the econometric analysis find that all categories
of support programs have been effective in promoting private R&D and innovation,
except the procurement program. The econometric analysis finds the tax incentive
to be the most effective, followed by the loan program, human resource program,
and technical consultancy. This is consistent with the OECD evaluation: “Tax incen-
tives for R&D in Korea are generous and cover every stage: facility investment,
R&D outlays, technology transfer” (Baek and Jones 2005).13
The STEPI survey also identifies gaps between what private industries want and
what the support programs offer. According to the survey, industries demand more
government support at earlier stages of innovation. Specifically, industries need more
government support at the stages of information gathering and planning (24 percent)
and R&D (41 percent), while the current programs are focused on R&D (58 percent),
commercialization (13 percent), and marketing (21 percent). In short, the current pro-
grams, which place greater emphasis on the later stages of innovation (commercial-
ization and marketing), do not reflect the reality that industries need more assistance
at the earlier stage (information gathering and planning). 
What Korea Reaped from the Investments
Evaluations of the performance of R&D and innovation activities in Korea are
mixed. Korea excels over other countries in R&D inputs, such as human resources
and financing, but lags far behind in output. Moreover, R&D results have not been
linked effectively to industrial uses. 
Despite such criticisms, one cannot deny the positive contributions that the R&D
and innovation efforts have made. Rapid growth in R&D investment has led to a
remarkable increase in patent registration. The number of patents registered with
the Korea Industrial Property Office increased from 1,808 in 1981 to 123,705 in
2007, an increase of almost 70 times in 26 years. Furthermore, Korea ranked fourth
in the world in the number of 2007 Patent Cooperation Treaty applications, triadic
patents registered in 2006, and U.S. patents registered in 2007. In the production of
industrial property, Korea trails only the United States, Japan, and Germany. Of
these, U.S. patents are sometimes used as an indicator of a nation’s international
technological competitiveness. Only five U.S. patents were granted to Koreans in
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1969, compared with 1,161 in 1995 and 6,295 in 2007, putting Korea in fourth
place in the world (see table 6). According to the U.S. Department of Commerce in
the late 1990s, Korea was prominent in technology areas such as information tech-
nology, pharmaceuticals, advanced materials, and automotives (Albert 1998). 
Another important development is the remarkable increase in the number of sci-
entific publications in internationally recognized academic journals. According to
the Science Citation Index, the number of scientific publications written by Koreans
increased from a mere 171 in 1980 to 25,494 in 2007. Korea is now the twelfth
largest producer of scientific publications in the world (see table 7). 
R&D efforts have also contributed to the development of high-tech industries in
Korea. Korea’s technological competitiveness in semiconductors, displays, cellular
phones, computers, telecommunications equipment, and so on is partly the result of
the government-industry collaborative R&D.14
Even though Korea acquired technological competitiveness in many high-tech
products, its reliance on foreign core technology continues. For example, Korea suc-
ceeded in commercializing the CDMA (code division multiple access) technology, but
the Korean cellular phone manufacturers paid a cumulative royalty of more than 
W 5 trillion to Qualcomm from 1995 to 2008 (NSTC 2009). Korea’s overseas roy-
alty payments are concentrated in the areas where Korea is known to have interna-
tional competitiveness. Korea’s industrial R&D and innovation have been focused
too much on commercializing foreign technologies and too little on developing orig-
inal technologies, such as new materials, components, devices, and designs. 
TABLE 6. Number of KIPO Patents Granted and U.S. Patents Granted to Koreans,
1985–2007
Type of patent 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007
Korea Industrial Property Office (KIPO) 
patents issued 2,687 7,620 12,512 34,956 73,512 123,705
U.S. patents granted to Koreans 41 225 1,161 3,314 4,352 6,295
Korea’s world ranking in U.S. patents issued 24 9 8 8 7 4
Source: KOITA and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
Note: In 1981, 1,808 KIPO patents were granted.
TABLE 7. Number of Korean Publications in the Science Citation Index, 1980–2007
Indicator 1980 1985 1993 1997 2000 2007
Number of Korean publications 171 1,227 2,997 9,124 12,245 25,494
Rank in the world — 37 27 17 16 12
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association. 
Note: — = not available.
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The Link between Innovation and Industrial Competitiveness 
In a neo-Schumpeterian sense, success in forging industrial competitiveness through
innovation may imply a sustainable increase in the share in the market or in world
trade (Cantwell 2003). Based on this, it is possible to assess the contribution of R&D
and innovation to industrial competitiveness by examining how R&D and innova-
tion affect changes in the commodity structure of exports and changes in the share of
major export commodities in world trade. 
As shown in table 8, in the 1980s Korea was engaged mainly in the trade of 
medium-low-tech and low-tech commodities and moved gradually toward higher-
technology commodities. Now Korea’s exports are highly concentrated in high-tech
products, such as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, displays, and so
on.15 The share of high-tech and high-medium-tech products in Korea’s exports
increased from 14 percent in the 1980s to 43 percent in the 2000s. 
The contribution of individual industries to exports changed drastically from 1990
to 2007 (see table 9). The share of primary and light industries in total exports
declined dramatically. The share of primary industry declined from 4.9 to 1.5 percent,
and the share of textiles declined from 26.7 to 3.7 percent. In contrast, the share of
high-tech products rose significantly. In particular, precision machinery, telecommuni-
cations equipment, displays, and automobiles account for almost 40 percent of total
exports. The highly concentrated export structure of Korea reflects the highly concen-
trated distribution of Korea’s R&D expenditures and patents. Of the Korean patents
registered in 2006 (KOITA 2008), electronics and communications accounted for 
54 percent and machinery accounted for 15 percent. This is consistent with industrial
R&D expenditures, which are concentrated in a few industries such as telecommuni-
cations, transportation, and so on. R&D-intensive industries clearly have gained mar-
ket share, while low-R&D industries have lost market share. This is confirmed by
TABLE 8. Top 10 Export Commodities, 1980–2007
Rank 1980 1990 2000 2007
1 Apparel Apparel Semiconductors Automobiles
2 Iron and steel Semiconductors Automobiles Semiconductors
3 Ships Shoes Ships Telecommunications
equipment
4 Synthetic fiber Ships Cell phones Ships 
5 Audio Video equipment Synthetic fiber Petroleum products
6 Tire Iron and steel Auto parts Displays
7 Wooden products Synthetic fiber Display Auto parts
8 Miscellaneous Computers Telecommunications Computer
goods equipment
9 Semiconductors Audio equipment Computers Visual instruments 
10 Video Automobiles Color televisions Electronic parts
Source: Korea International Trade Association.
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World Trade Organization data, which show that Korea’s world market share
increased in technology-intensive products, such as office machines, telecommunica-
tions equipment, automotive parts, and chemicals. In those areas, R&D investments
also increased significantly.16
Contribution to Economic Growth
It is hard to estimate how much investments in R&D and innovation have con-
tributed to economic growth, because doing so involves complex data and method-
ological issues. One widely used method of measuring this was first suggested by
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), who calculated the growth rate of total factor
productivity (TFP) and related this to changes in the stock of R&D. Their estimates
of R&D elasticity of TFP ranged between 0.17 and 0.34. Coe and Helpman (1995)
conducted the same experiments using data for 22 OECD countries for the period
of 1971–90. They found that the elasticity was 0.234 for G-7 countries, but only
0.07 for OECD countries, which suggests that R&D investments of G-7 countries
were a lot more efficient than those of OECD countries. 
Similar attempts have been made to measure the R&D elasticity of TFP in Korea.
Kim (2004) estimates that R&D elasticity of TFP in Korea for the period of 1970–2002
was 0.13, while an earlier study by Shin (1996) finds a higher number, 0.166. More
recently, Shin (2006) finds that Japan’s R&D is the most efficient of OECD countries
TABLE 9. Share of Exports, by Industry, 1990–2007
percent of exports
Industry 1990 2007
Declining share in exports
Primary industries 4.9 1.5
Textiles 22.7 3.7
Shoes 6.6 0.1
Home appliances 11.3 3.7
Maintaining share in exports
Steel and iron 6.7 6.2
Computers 3.9 3.7
Increasing share in exports
Petrochemicals 2.0 7.8
Automobiles 3.0 10.1
Precision machineries 2.8 6.9
Telecommunications equipment 0.8 8.3
Semiconductors 7.0 10.6
Flat displays 0.0 4.5
Ships 4.3 6.5
Source: Rearranged from the Korea International Trade Association. 
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(0.278–0.292), followed by the United States (0.167–0.263) and Korea (0.133–0.199).
Korea’s R&D elasticity of TFP is almost the same as the average elasticity for all OECD
countries (0.188). This suggests that R&D in Korea has performed relatively well in
enhancing the productivity of the economy.
A very interesting study by Lee and others (2007) estimates the R&D elasticity in
Korea separately for high-tech, high-medium-tech, medium-low-tech, and low-tech
industry. They find that R&D elasticity of TFP is 0.32 for high-tech industry and
0.10 for high-medium-tech industry. However, in medium-low-tech and low-tech
industries, TFP does not respond to changes in the stock of R&D—that is, R&D
does not affect productivity in those industries.
Many economists use the aggregate production function to estimate the contri-
bution of R&D stock to economic growth. The results of estimations vary depend-
ing on the periods covered, data, and methods. Lee (2008) estimates that the stock
of R&D accounted for 22.7 percent of economic growth in Korea during the peri-
od of 1971–90 (see table 10). In addition, the contribution of R&D stock to eco-
nomic growth has been increasing along with economic development. The share of
R&D stock in economic growth during the period 1991–2006 is estimated to be 
30 percent. But, sometimes, study results vary too widely to reconcile. For example,
according to Hah (2004), R&D stock explains 48 percent of the growth of TFP,
while Bae and others (2006) give a figure of 82 percent. 
Achievements and Challenges
Korea has made enormous strides in science and technology over the past four
decades. By making continuous and massive investments in R&D and innovation,
Korea has succeeded in building a unique innovation system that supports sustain-
able growth of the Korean economy. The factors that have influenced the Korean
TABLE 10. Sources of Economic Growth, 1971–2006
1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–06
% of % of % of % of 
Indicator Growth economic Growth economic Growth economic Growth economic
and input rate growth rate growth rate growth rate growth
Annual 6.99 100.0 8.37 100.0 5.90 100.0 4.52 100.0
growth 
rate
Labor 2.47 35.3 1.95 23.3 1.10 18.6 1.05 23.2
Capital 3.29 47.1 3.08 36.8 2.75 47.0 1.43 31.7
TFP 1.23 17.6 3.34 39.9 2.05 34.8 2.04 45.1
R&D 1.74a 22.7a 1.61b 29.9b
Source: Lee 2008.
a. Average for the period 1971–90.
b. Average for the period 1991–2006.
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innovation system the most are (1) outward-looking development strategy, (2) large
firm–oriented industrial policy, and (3) human resources, among many others. These
are the sources of both the strength and the weakness of the system. 
The strength of the Korean innovation system is its dynamism, which is fueled by
the strong commitment of the government to “technology-based national develop-
ment” and private industries’ efforts to be competitive. Despite the short history of
R&D, Korea has harvested a rich crop of patents, scientific papers, and exports of
technology-intensive products, such as semiconductors, cellular phones, liquid crys-
tal displays, automobiles, and others. 
Yet there are problems, too. Even though Korea spends a larger share of GDP on
R&D than other countries, it still lags far behind advanced industrial countries in
the cumulative R&D stock, which is really the determinant of a nation’s knowledge
power. The challenge is to overcome the disadvantage of being a late starter.
Second, the weakness in basic sciences poses a fundamental problem for the
Korean innovation system, because scientific capability determines the technologi-
cal potential of a nation. Since the Korean R&D efforts have been devoted mainly
to technology development, scientific research has been more or less neglected. The
lack of a strong scientific base limits technological progress in Korea. The weakness
in science results not just from a funding policy that favors technology development
but also from weak university research capability. Therefore, strengthening univer-
sity research poses a major policy challenge. 
Third, excessive reliance on private industries for R&D investments has made the
innovation system vulnerable in two ways. On the one hand, the system places so
much emphasis on applied research and development that it has failed to build up a
strong foundation for the long-term development of science and technology. On the
other hand, the R&D system is too sensitive to changes in the economic and busi-
ness environment. For instance, large Korean enterprises responded to the financial
crisis of 1997 by cutting their R&D spending about 14 percent, almost destabiliz-
ing the R&D system. If the crisis had continued for several more years, the whole
system would have collapsed.
Fourth, the Korean innovation system needs to be made more open to the outer
world. Korea accounts for about 3 percent of the world R&D activities, which means
that 97 percent of the world’s R&D activities are taking place outside Korea. In order
to access the knowledge, ideas, and technology generated and produced outside the
country, Korea needs to open the system more and promote interactions with foreign
scientists and institutions. Korea’s level of international interaction is the lowest
among OECD countries; if not checked, this will constitute a barrier to further
growth in the future. 
Fifth, the extremely high concentration of R&D activities poses a serious prob-
lem. High concentration means that only a few large firms are actively involved in
R&D, while others are not. If this persists, Korean industries will be distinguished
as either technologically advanced or technologically backward firms and sectors,
which will make interfirm and interindustry interactions—the key elements of
innovation—unlikely. This is particularly important because even large enterprises
cannot sustain competitiveness without technologically strong domestic SMEs.
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Lessons
Korean experiences offer some lessons for policy makers responsible for the devel-
opment of education, trade, and technology in developing countries. There is no
doubt that education determines a nation’s ability to absorb new knowledge and
technology. Education provides individuals with initial tacit knowledge, which is an
essential building block of technological learning. The government should assume
full responsibility for promoting the development of human resources. Investing in
education in advance, as Korea did in the 1960s and 1970s, is essential to laying a
foundation for industrial development. As an economy develops, technological com-
petence becomes critical. To build up technological competence, high-caliber scien-
tists and engineers are needed who are capable of dealing with developments at sci-
entific and technological frontiers. In other words, advanced education in science
and technology should come first when preparing to enter a knowledge economy. In
the case of Korea, education and industrialization helped to sustain and accelerate
their mutual development. Education made technological learning, and therefore
industrialization, possible, while industrialization enhanced the rate of return on
investment in education, further promoting demand for education.
Korea’s industrialization evolved from imitation to innovation. In the initial
stage, Korean industries attained technological capability through informal channels
for technology transfer, such as OEM production arrangements, reverse engineering
of imported machines, technical training as part of the importation of turnkey
plants, and so on. Contrary to the experiences in other developing countries, in
Korea FDI played a modest role in technological learning. To lay the initial techno-
logical foundation, many Korean industries resorted to nonmarket processes, rely-
ing on the ability of workers to absorb acquired technology. This approach enabled
them to acquire technology at lower cost and maintain independence in their busi-
ness operations. But Korea had to pay a high cost for this. It had to forgo many of
the technological opportunities that foreign direct investors might have offered. 
By adopting an outward-looking development strategy, the government drove
Korean industries into the competitive international market, putting them under
great pressure to acquire learning. Korean industries responded to these pressures by
investing heavily in technology development. By developing technological compe-
tence, they have been able to survive international competition and establish world
prominence in high-technology areas such as telecommunications, semiconductor
memory chips, liquid crystal displays, automobiles, shipbuilding, and so on. Protec-
tionist policy may be effective in creating initial market opportunities for domestic
industries, but if such a policy is prolonged, industries will develop immunity to mar-
ket pressures for innovation. It may be for this reason that export-oriented firms
achieved technological learning more rapidly than import-substituting firms.
Since the early 1960s, the government has played a key role in Korea’s develop-
ment. The government first initiated S&T development as part of the national eco-
nomic development plan and subsequently led its development, not just as a rule set-
ter but also as a target setter and financier. But as industrial development proceeds,
it has become increasingly difficult for the government to intervene in economic as
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well as R&D activities because of the increased scale and complexity of industrial
activities. Therefore, the pattern of government intervention in science and technol-
ogy had to change from direct involvement to indirect involvement as a facilitator
and promoter. The Korean government’s policy supports have been very effective in
promoting R&D and innovation in the private sector, but they also have created a
culture that tends to make private enterprises overly dependent on government pol-
icy in making business decisions.
In sum, Korea owes much to its human resources and outward-looking develop-
ment strategy for technological development and industrialization. The Korean
experience offers two major lessons. First, human resources are the key to S&T
development and thus to economic growth, and, second, nothing can motivate pri-
vate businesses to invest in technology development better than market competition.
For Korea to sustain the past development into the future, it has to strengthen
capacity in basic scientific research and improve the framework conditions for inno-
vation, the core of which is a competitive market.
Notes
1. Korea is a very small, resource-poor country: its land area is only 220,000 square kilo-
meters or 99,000 square kilometers excluding the northern part, which is currently under
a different political and economic system. Korea’s land, of which 75 percent is nonarable
mountains, produces not a single drop of oil and contains virtually no valuable natural
resources. Still it has to support a population of 70 million people.
2. This number is an estimate based on the figure for 1969, which was 5,337 (MOST 1984).
3. However, Confucianism may have adverse effects on the development of science and tech-
nology in Korea: it stresses patriotism and demands loyalty to the traditional values and,
therefore, tends to devalue new, unconventional ideas. Korean society, like other Confu-
cian societies, is less open to different ideas and systems, which works as a barrier to inno-
vation. 
4. Foreign investors also did not view Korea as an attractive place for investment. Even
though Korea took a very open and liberal policy on foreign direct investment in the
1960s, few investments were made primarily because of the questions about Korea’s polit-
ical stability and economic outlook.
5. For more discussions on the roles of technology suppliers and recipients in different modes
of technology transfer, see Kim (1997, 100–03).
6. Another negative effect is that large-scale loans that had been brought in instead of FDI
might have contributed to the financial crisis of 1997 (Chung and Suh 2006). 
7. Some—for example, Amsden (1989)—say that the Korean government played the role of
the market in allocating development resources during the early period of development
when the Korean market system was not mature enough to function efficiently. 
8. OECD (1996, 91–92). The ratio of technology imports to business R&D was 15 percent
in 2007 (KOITA 2008).
9. In addition to the restructuring by large firms, the government’s drive to create venture
companies changed the capital market conditions for start-up companies.
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10. The survey covers 2,737 companies of 23 industries for the period from 2002 to 2004. It
follows the OECD manual and has been authorized as official national statistics by the
National Statistics Administration of Korea.
11. There are cases where R&D investments are constrained by the shortage of suitable man-
power. OECD (2003) emphasizes the importance of the supply of skilled scientists and
engineers as one of the framework conditions for achieving R&D spending targets.
12. The major legal bases for the incentives are the Technology Development Promotion Law
(1967) and the Industrial Development Promotion Law.
13. Despite the overall effectiveness of the programs, the STEPI study concludes that the
numerous programs are not well understood by the potential users and need to be made
easier and simpler to understand and access (Shin and others 2006a).
14. NSTC (2009) provides an analysis of how government R&D programs contributed to the
development of major export items.
15. This follows the OECD categorization of high-tech, high-medium-tech, medium-low-tech,
and low-tech.
16. In the case of office machinery, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales increased from 5
to 6 percent in Korea during 1990–2007, contributing to the increase in Korea’s share of
world trade from 2 percent in 1980 to 6 percent in 2007. More contrasting is the case of
telecommunications equipment, where R&D intensity increased from 3 to 6 percent over
the same period, which contributed to the change in its share of world trade from 0 in
1980 to 7 percent in 2007.
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